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BROTHERS WITHOUT BORDERS? : 
INVESTIGATING PROCESSES OF NORM 
EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MUSLIM 
BROTHERHOOD
 Anna Mysliwiec
The international Muslim Brotherhood is occasionally characterized by American commentators, especially those with right-wing leanings, as a radical Islamist move-
ment on par with al-Qaeda: transnational, ambitious, and therefore 
inherently threatening to U.S. interests. Following the Gaza flotilla 
crisis in June 2010, Thomas Joscelyn commented in the Weekly 
Standard: “The more one looks into the details of the flotilla the 
more it becomes clear that the Brotherhood used the humanitar-
ian mission for its own purpose, namely, to assist its Palestinian 
branch—Hamas.”1 Joscelyn paints a picture of a tight-knit, well-
organized movement, a many-headed hydra that could pop up any-
where to accomplish its own nefarious ends. 
The reality is quite different. Although branches of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood are active in over seventy countries, coordination 
among them is loose and each national branch focuses on domestic 
issues rather than transnational ones. In fact it is the loose nature 
of the network structure and the focus on domestic politics that ac-
counts for much of the Brotherhood’s success. Nathan Brown has 
debunked the notion that the Brotherhood is tightly organized in-
ternationally, instead describing it as “a tame framework for a group 
of loosely linked, ideologically similar movements that recognize 
each other, swap stories and experiences in occasional meetings, 
and happily subscribe to a formally international ideology without 
giving it much priority.”2 He notes, however, that many members 
do refer to the Brotherhood “way of doing things.” 
Brown’s account does not, however, examine the landscape 
of Brotherhood ideology. For example, has evolution in the philo-
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sophical approach of one Brotherhood caused new norms to de-
velop in the others? In recent years, the Brotherhoods in Egypt, 
Jordan, and Syria have all given increasing attention to matters of 
liberal reform, human rights, and democracy in their platforms. In 
this analysis, I ask two related questions: (a) to what extent have 
Muslim Brotherhood branches adopted the language and prac-
tice of civil and political rights and (b) have such norms “cascaded” 
within the movement, or are they the result of strategic calcula-
tions based on local political context? While it has been established 
that the Brotherhood’s various national branches are sometimes at 
odds with each other despite their common ideology, little has been 
written on how that ideology varies and evolves within the interna-
tional movement. Because the normative model advanced by the 
Brotherhood forms a significant part of its international impact, 
the human rights framework allows us to consider how the Mus-
lim Brotherhood has interacted with another major transnational 
trend: the rise of human rights norms and the networks that have 
succeeded in institutionalizing them.  In this analysis, I will exam-
ine the stances of the Brotherhoods in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria 
toward human rights and liberalism, and in doing so will examine 
the extent to which these result from domestic opportunities and 
constraints as opposed to normative changes within the interna-
tional network.
 The fact that many of the Brotherhood’s national branches 
have fought to remain intact despite immense repression—as in 
the case of Syria—suggests that there may be something uniquely 
compelling about the Brotherhood “way of doing things.” Never-
theless, the literature on political Islam suggests that the strategy 
of a given organization depends on political opportunity struc-
tures, particularly the extent that the group is able to participate 
in politics. While international linkages may inform the choices of 
national Brotherhoods, strategic choices shaped by fluctuations in 
the domestic political landscape play a larger role. The ability of 
Islamist networks to embed themselves in the structures and con-
cerns of a society largely determines their success, and the Brother-
hood has proven itself to be uniquely capable of that task. 
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THE BROTHERHOOD IN CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE
It is not immediately obvious where the international Muslim 
Brotherhood fits on the spectrum of global non-state actors. While 
some commentators insist that it maintains ties to terrorism, it is 
not a terrorist network. Nor is there a Muslim institutional equiv-
alent to the Catholic Church in world politics, as Islam has his-
torically had no single power center. It is perhaps more similar to 
transnational advocacy networks, as theorized by Margaret Keck 
and Kathryn Sikkink. Like networks organized around liberal 
democratic values, moderate Islamist discourses embodied in the 
Muslim Brotherhood provide individuals with a language through 
which they can make claims about their rights—one that resonates 
with common religious, philosophical, and cultural ideas—and 
provides a means of resistance against the prevailing, often abusive 
political order. While the literature on normative change tends to 
focus on actors and networks promoting liberal—and predomi-
nantly Western—norms, “liberalism is only one possible ideologi-
cal framework that can be used for framing political action.”3 Po-
litical Islam provides a competing normative framework, offering 
both “ideational resources and material support” that individuals 
can access to make political claims.  In all of its manifestations, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has offered a powerful source of opposition 
to the secular state. In the Egyptian context, in terms of “both po-
litical power and ‘civil society’ … the Islamists seem to be the most 
robust possible alternative to the present regime.”4 Members of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood are on the front lines in the struggle 
for civil and political rights and are often imprisoned for their at-
tempts to participate in politics. For example, the Egyptian Broth-
erhood provided important organizational resources to sustain the 
recent revolution that forced former President Hosni Mubarak 
from power. Despite the strength of their normative claim, Muslim 
Brotherhood-associated groups challenge states through participa-
tion in political life. 
Islamism is a “movement of movements”: “its overarching 
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common goal is the establishment or reinforcement of Islamic laws 
and norms as the solution to economic, political, and cultural cri-
ses.”5 With fifty-three member states, the Organization of the Is-
lamic Conference (OIC) is one of the more visible transnational 
Islamic actors, but it is deeply divided, reflecting regional conflict 
among its members. State-centric “conservative contenders” like 
the OIC have failed to provide meaningful transnational leader-
ship. The real transnational Muslim community exists at the level 
of civil society, with movements creating change at the domestic 
level.6 As the oldest Islamist organization in the world, the Mus-
lim Brotherhood represents one of the most important strains of 
transnational Islamic activity—one that differs significantly from 
the terrorist networks that receive more attention in the American 
media. As part of the constellation of transnational Muslim civil 
society, it represents a
global network of religious activists . . . who communicate with 
each other, feed off each other’s ideas, collectively develop re-
ligious ideologies with political significance, perhaps aid each 
other with funds, and . . . form transnational groups whose main 
intellectual referent derives from religious dogma.7
Many of the most significant transnational linkages have been 
“transnational popular movements whose struggles were primarily 
against their own rulers rather than the West per se,” and the Mus-
lim Brotherhood is foremost among these organizations.8 If we put 
the far-fetched goal of a caliphate to the side, the existence of trans-
national Islam seems to not pose a threat to the state system.9  
THE INTERNATIONAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
The Muslim Brotherhood has established chapters in over 
seventy countries.10 After the organization had become firmly es-
tablished in Egypt, Egyptian activists traveled outward to establish 
branches across the Middle East and international students study-
ing at Al-Azhar University in Cairo brought the ideas of Hassan 
al-Banna, the Brotherhood’s founder, back to their native countries. 
Chapters consequently sprung up in Djibouti in 1933 and in Syria, 
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Palestine, and Jordan in 1946.11 Early in the organization’s history, 
the various national branches collaborated on international proj-
ects, as when the Brotherhoods in Jerusalem, Egypt, Syria, and Jor-
dan participated alongside the regular forces of Arab armies during 
the 1948 war.12 
The International Organization is headed by a “general guide” 
who also serves as the head of the Egyptian organization. Most 
national chapters, headed by a “general supervisor,” belong to this 
international body, though some are no longer officially affiliated.13 
The Egypt chapter attempted to tighten coordination in the 1980s 
but met stiff resistance from other chapters. The Egyptians soon 
accepted, as Sudanese Brother Hasan al-Turabi warned, that “you 
cannot run the world from Cairo.”14 When national Brotherhoods 
have sought the intervention of the International Organization in 
internal debates, its slow and confusing responses have sometimes 
rendered its leadership irrelevant.15 The national chapters are thus 
“parallel and fraternal movements,” and when they do influence 
each other, it is often in a bilateral fashion.16 It is thus more use-
ful to think of the Brotherhood as a network rather than a tightly 
coordinated organization. The branches of the Muslim Brother-
hood occasionally come into direct conflict with each other, as 
when the majority of national chapters supported Saddam Hus-
sein’s invasion of Kuwait,17 provoking the incensed departure of 
the Kuwaiti Brothers. Likewise, during the occupation of Iraq, the 
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood refused to deal with American of-
ficials, while members of its Iraqi counterpart participated in (and 
won) American-sponsored elections for Parliament.18 Clearly, the 
Brotherhood’s flexibility in adapting to various national contexts 
has contributed to its success.19 It is important to note however, 
that despite the fact the various Brotherhood organizations dis-
agree about some particular tactics, all abstain from “global jihad” 
and work through democratic processes when possible.20 
In an interview with the newspaper Asharq Alawsat, Dr. Ka-
mal al Helbawi, a spokesman for the Brotherhood in the West, 
noted that the Brotherhood works primarily through “meetings, 
continuous consultations, exchange of experience, networking and 
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joint efforts.” The Brothers also meet at weddings, funerals, and 
other social occasions. Delineating exactly where the Brotherhood 
starts and ends proves difficult, as the Egyptian chapter inspired 
a variety of movements that maintain varying degrees of intimacy 
with the flagship organization. While it can be difficult to say pre-
cisely when the Brotherhood in one country influenced the actions 
of Brothers in another, whether to reinforce Brotherhood ideology 
or to encourage a certain course of action, it is nevertheless clear 
that communication does occur. One such example is the Danish 
cartoon controversy: “[the Brotherhood’s] transnational networks 
helped spread the word about the cartoons, [and] all branches of-
ficially called for peaceful protest.”21 Brotherhood organizations 
called for dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims, whereas ji-
hadi groups chose more confrontational forms of protest.22 While 
national Brotherhoods may occasionally diverge from the peaceful 
norm, this example suggests that the Brotherhood is indeed bound 
together by certain values. The transnational mobility of indi-
viduals in the era of globalization has undoubtedly influenced the 
Brotherhood’s stances as well. Jordanian Brother Ishaq al-Farhan 
rejected the dar al-islam/dar al-harb dichotomy that once divided 
the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds: “This distinction is histori-
cal because in the past Muslims inhabited in one place and non-
Muslims in another… But now it does not make much sense to 
divide the world in terms of this duality. There are many Muslims 
who . . . are American citizens.”23 Furthermore, Brothers who have 
migrated may influence the politics of their countries of origin: 
In order to understand how agenda setting and the evolution of 
political strategy work in Middle Eastern-based Islamist move-
ments such as the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, one needs 
today to pay as much (if not more) attention to Brotherhood 
supporters within Europe’s Muslim population as one does to 
the group’s formal leadership in Egypt.24 
Globalization and immigration are thus among the factors that 
shape normative evolution within the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, 
while I will argue that changes in domestic opportunity structures 
drive Brotherhood adoption of new strategies and norms, the role 
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of the international network in shaping the ideological choices of 
the Brotherhoods cannot be discounted.
THE FLAGSHIP ORGANIZATION: THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM 
BROTHERHOOD 
Founded by schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928, the 
Muslim Brotherhood during its apolitical early years focused on 
building membership and providing humanitarian aid, eventually 
fielding candidates in Egypt’s 1941 parliamentary elections. How-
ever, an attempt on Nasser’s life by the Brotherhood’s paramilitary 
apparatus led to severe imprisonment and torture for the Broth-
ers.25 In response to this repression, Brotherhood philosopher 
Sayyid Qutb argued that the Egyptian state was a legitimate target 
of jihad. Hasan al-Hudaybi, who succeeded al-Banna as the head 
of the Egypt chapter, disagreed, and his more moderate view pre-
vailed. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood renounced the use of 
violence in the 1970s and has embraced the democratic process. 
Although the Brotherhood was illegal under Egypt’s Emergency 
Law, its candidates ran for office as independents and in 2005 won 
20 percent of parliamentary seats,26 although they were blocked 
from repeating this success by unfair elections in November 2010.
In the 1980s, the Brotherhood began to ally with the Wafd, 
Liberal, and Labor parties, indicating a willingness to compromise 
on ideology in order to forge coalitions with secular groups. How-
ever, the Brotherhood continued to be reluctant to state its politi-
cal goals, citing the political climate but probably also out of a de-
sire to avoid internal ideological splits.27 In the 1980s and 1990s, 
the Brotherhood became prominent in student elections and its 
younger reform-minded members won majorities on the governing 
boards of most major professional syndicates.28 Due partly to pres-
sure from the United States, the Egyptian government held rela-
tively free elections in 2005, in which President Mubarak ran for 
reelection. In the run-up to elections, the Brotherhood published 
a “Reform Initiative” amd ultimately won 88 out of 444 seats. The 
heavy media coverage during and since the elections served to en-
72 Mysliwiec   •  Brothers Without Borders? 
courage the Brotherhood to articulate its stance more clearly.29 This 
movement toward moderation resulted both from new opportuni-
ties in the political system and from an evolution in the Brother-
hood’s leadership as younger, reformist members have increasingly 
made their voices heard. Imprisonment, torture, and death sen-
tences during the Nasserite era soured the old guard of the Broth-
erhood toward formal politics, causing them to prioritize religious 
work and eschew coalition building. The political experience of 
the new guard, on the other hand, was their leadership of student 
groups in the Sadat era, when they gained experience in forging 
coalitions with secular student groups.30  Over the course of a few 
short weeks following the January 15, 2011 “day of rage” a popular 
uprising led to Mubarak’s resignation from office on February 11, 
which ended decades of authoritarian leadership in Egypt. While 
secular opposition groups started the Tahrir Square protests with-
out the initial participation of the Brotherhood, younger Brothers 
ultimately prompted the organization to play a key role in sustain-
ing the protests. The Brotherhood organized emergency medical 
clinics and established checkpoints to prevent Mubarak supporters 
from fomenting unrest.31 It called for protests to remain peaceful, 
eschewed the use of controversial religious slogans, and announced 
its support for secular activist Muhammad ElBaradei as spokes-
man for the opposition.32 Its actions suggest a willingness to work 
in close partnership with secular groups and to subordinate its own 
goals to those of the broader struggle for democracy.33  
However, many question the Brotherhood's commitment 
to democracy. The phrase “one man, one vote, one time” has come 
to embody the concerns of many that an election that brings the 
Brotherhood to power will be the last election. Clifford May of the 
National Review wondered: “Do the Egyptians demonstrating in 
Tahrir Square appreciate how threatening the Muslim Brother-
hood is to the freedom they hope to win?”34 Several authors, how-
ever, point to signs that the commitment is genuine. The fact that 
the Brotherhood’s political vision does not perfectly coincide with 
a liberal democratic one—and their openness about this fact—
suggests that they are committed to democracy, but one centered 
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around the community rather than the individual.35 Likewise, 
following the relatively free 2005 elections, the Mubarak regime 
cracked down hard on the movement—this was especially evident 
in the November 2010 elections, in which no Brotherhood-affil-
iated candidates were seated. Despite these challenges the Broth-
erhood has maintained its commitment to democracy, an action 
that “speaks more clearly than would similar talk of democracy at 
a time when electoral victory seemed within reach.”36 Despite calls 
within the movement to abandon political participation in favor 
of charitable work, it continued to participate in democratic poli-
tics, running candidates in the June 2007 Shura Council elections 
despite government interference.37 Essam al-Erian, chief of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s political bureau, defended the decision on 
the grounds that it served to delegitimize the regime. Thus, while 
there is evidence to suggest that the Brotherhood’s commitment 
to democracy is genuine, comments like al-Erian’s suggest that 
the Brotherhood might only be committed to democracy when it 
serves their interests. Given the level of secrecy surrounding Broth-
erhood operations, it is nearly impossible to ascertain which is the 
case. Following Mubarak’s resignation, the Brotherhood did state 
its intention to form a political party once a democracy has been 
established.38
Egyptian Islamists, including prominent Brotherhood lead-
ers, have produced a rich philosophy of governance.39 For these 
thinkers, the state is instituted in order to create the Muslim 
community through the implementation of sharia law, which has 
historically served as a constraint on state power. Ultimate pow-
er resides with the community, which chooses a leader and has a 
contract with him.40 Moderate Islamists call for an independent 
judiciary, civil society organizations, and a multi-party system “in 
which each party offers a different view regarding the best strat-
egy for . . . implementing sharia.”41 Islamist thinkers derive a wide 
range of civil and political rights from the Islamic principle of jus-
tice, including life, dignity, property, security, freedom, equality, and 
the accountability of the ruler.42 While arguing that a woman or 
a Coptic Christian cannot become head of state, they emphasize 
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that minority rights would be protected in an Islamic state, as reli-
gious diversity comes from God.43 Unlike liberal democrats, how-
ever, the Brothers see the state as a transformative—rather than 
a threatening—institution, responsible for creating good Muslim 
citizens and a moral community, and they therefore authorize it to 
interfere quite robustly in citizens’ private lives.
In addition to its apparent commitment to democracy, the 
Brotherhood has increasingly focused on human rights. Under 
Mubarak, the Egyptian government committed serious human 
rights violations in the name of its Emergency Law, closing down 
mosques, limiting the right of association, and making arbitrary 
detentions. While a human rights movement with transnational 
linkages developed, spearheaded by the Egyptian Organization for 
Human Rights, the Mubarak regime largely succeeded in discred-
iting secular activists as inauthentic and cutting off their access to 
external networks.44 Some Islamists share Mubarak’s view, criticiz-
ing “human rights dependency” on Western organizations.45 
In the 1980s, the syndicates were beset by a lack of transpar-
ency, the absence of a clear decision-making process, and financial 
mismanagement, problems that leading Brothers of the new guard, 
building on their experiences as student activists, tackled after win-
ning majorities on the syndicate boards.46 In the 1990s, Brothers 
formed human rights committees in professional associations and 
began to advocate on behalf of members suffering persecution, as 
well as campaign against the Emergency Law.47 Critics sometimes 
suggest that “Islamists are only interested in human rights when 
it is their supporters who . . . are suffering persecution.”48 How-
ever, the case of the professional associations suggests that institu-
tional changes created by Islamists may also benefit non-Islamists. 
Thanks to Islamist participation, the Egyptian Bar Association’s 
already impressive “involvement with Islamist human rights con-
cerns became more visible.”49 Many Islamists even served on the 
executive board of the secular Egyptian Organization for Human 
Rights. This activism was not lost on the Mubarak regime, how-
ever, and Islamist human rights activism was cut short following 
the arrest of many of its leaders in 1995 and 1996. The regime had 
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a vested interest in cutting off the nascent ties between Islamist and 
secular human rights activists, just as it did when it shut down the 
centrist Hizb al-Wasat, a party formed by younger Brothers that 
developed ties with non-Islamist actors. In 2004, likely in response 
to increased political openness in the run-up to the 2005 elections, 
the Brotherhood formed its own human rights committee, led 
by lawyer Abdul Monem Abdul Maqsoud, to monitor violations 
against prisoners and detainees, student rights, and acts of discrim-
ination.50 Of thirty committee members, only two belong to the 
Brotherhood, suggesting a commitment to defending the rights of 
all Egyptians, regardless of membership in the Brotherhood. 
Transnational linkages have played some role in shaping the 
Brotherhood's philosophy. Concerns about dependence on West-
ern organizations notwithstanding, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
official English website illustrates its increasing focus on human 
rights and its attempt to link to international advocacy organi-
zations. At the time of this writing, the articles included on the 
“Human Rights” page link to reports from Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, and Reporters Without Borders.51 Nor 
do liberal organizations provide the only option for transnational 
linkages. The London-based Islamic Human Rights Commission 
called upon its members to demand that the November 2010 elec-
tions be free and fair.52 Despite its shortcomings, the human rights 
movement “can take credit for having changed the way governments 
talk about their citizens and the expectations that citizens have of 
the way they should be treated by their government” and even the 
illiberal governments of the Middle East speak of upholding the 
rights of their citizens.53 That principle extends to the Muslim 
Brotherhood as well. Pressure from the United States under the 
Bush administration spurred the Egyptian state to greater political 
openness that created space for Brotherhood participation, and at-
tention to international opinion in this environment undoubtedly 
served to reinforce the Brotherhood’s commitment to democratic 
norms. The transnational mobility of individual Brothers and the 
norms they encountered in the process have likely played a role as 
well. However, it would be unfair to attribute liberal democratic 
76 Mysliwiec   •  Brothers Without Borders? 
thinking within the Brotherhood solely to the ascension of inter-
national norms. Islamic thought has a rich democratic tradition, 
as Bruce Rutherford and others have demonstrated. Furthermore, 
greater attention to democracy would not have been possible with-
out internal changes in the Brotherhood, especially the rise of the 
new guard of politically minded reformers. The Brotherhood’s ad-
herence to democracy despite repression reflects the strength of 
its normative commitments. Because of its historical suppression, 
it is impossible to know how much support the Muslim Brother-
hood will mobilize in the freer system that is still taking shape in 
Egypt.54 It is possible that it will no longer attract the numbers it 
did prior to the surge in organized secular opposition. Yet, just as 
greater political openness prompted the Brotherhood to clarify its 
views in 2005, the formation of a political party will undoubtedly 
require the Brotherhood to further clarify its views, including posi-
tions on human rights and liberal norms.55
SYRIA
 The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has had substantially less 
freedom to operate than its sister organizations in Jordan and 
Egypt. Founded when Egyptian Muslim Brothers took a promo-
tional tour through Syria in the 1930s, it initially participated in 
parliamentary politics after Syria gained independence.56 In 1963, 
the Ba’th party, dominated by the Shi’a-identified ‘Alawis, seized 
power and dissolved the parliamentary system. Scholars of politi-
cal Islam often argue that political exclusion radicalizes Islamist 
groups, while inclusion can foster moderation. Prevented from 
participating in the political system, the Syrian Brothers turned to 
violence. After a Brotherhood revolt in Hama in 1964, relations 
further deteriorated throughout the 1970s as the movement as-
sassinated senior military and Ba’th figures.57 The Syrian regime 
consequently detained and tortured thousands of Brothers,58 and 
the severe repression isolated the organization internationally.59 
Law No. 49 of 1980 made mere membership in the Brotherhood 
punishable by death.60 After the massacre at Hama in February 
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1982,61 most of the movement’s main leaders moved outside of 
Syria and headquarters were set up in London.62 The Syrian Broth-
ers initially supported the Iranian revolution, but with the alliance 
between Khomeini’s Iran and the Shi’a-leaning Asad’s Syria, the 
Brotherhood came to condemn Iran.63 “The support [the Broth-
erhood receives] from some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan, depends upon the relations between these countries 
and Syria,” and for that reason donors are more likely to give the 
Brothers leeway in their dealings with the regime when relations 
are bad.64 Because the boundaries of political Islam are shaped by 
state interactions, interstate relations serve to open and close the 
gateways to international support for the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 When Ali Al-Bayanouni became general guide of the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood in 1996, he “shifted the Brotherhood from 
armed struggle to political and media efforts against the regime” 
and expressed willingness to engage its leadership.65 This change 
in the Brotherhood’s stance preceded the accession of Hafez’s son 
Bashar in 2000, indicating that al-Bayanouni’s leadership was just 
as critical as the following changes in the political environment. 
With his promises of a new era of public freedoms and human 
rights, Bashar al-Asad’s accession to power seemed to provide a 
further opportunity for the Brotherhood.66 In its “Gentlemen’s 
Statement for Political Action,” it finally renounced violence—
decades after the Egyptian Brotherhood—and emphasized that 
the modern state must be built on a contract between ruler and 
ruled.67 Starting in 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood participated in 
the National Salvation Front (NSF), an alliance with secular op-
position groups in an “all-embracing movement for reform,” con-
troversially led by former Vice President ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, 
who had been responsible for violence against the Brotherhood.68 
As a result, the United States became willing to engage with the 
Brotherhood and the NSF on election monitoring and civil society 
promotion. The NSF’s priority in its relationship with the United 
States was to exert pressure on al-Asad Asad’s regime to improve 
its human rights record.69
 Israel’s invasion of Gaza in 2008 was a watershed event that 
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put the Syrian Brotherhood in a difficult position: it was their 
Shi’ite adversaries who were supporting the Palestinians who in 
the Brotherhood's mind ought to have been the Brotherhood’s 
cause célèbre.70 The Brotherhood consequently suspended its ac-
tions against the government and stated its desire to return to Syria 
to work with the regime. It has since withdrawn from the NSF 
in favor of a more accomodationist stance toward the regime, rec-
ognizing that its outsider status had made it irrelevant in Syrian 
society.71 The Brotherhood may have also acted in response to the 
United States, whose relations with the Asad regime have thawed. 
 Ali Sadreddin al-Bayanouni, who now lives in London, serves 
as an important leader of the Syrian Brotherhood. He has stated 
that “the Brotherhood has a very moderate understanding of Islam” 
and advocates for the rights of women and minorities, as well as 
for pluralist politics.72 Accordingly, for the Brotherhood, it appears 
that the moderation of recent years has been caused by changes in 
internal leadership (Bayanouni’s election), shifting political oppor-
tunity (Asad’s ascension and changing U.S. policy), and a simple 
exhaustion of the prior course of violent opposition. The transla-
tion of ideology into practice is not consistent across the trans-
national Muslim Brotherhood: the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
continued to use violence against the regime into the 1980s, while 
the Egyptian branch had renounced violence and was enjoying the 
fruits of Sadat’s relaxation of restraints. The Brotherhood’s prefer-
ence for moderation was evidently not strong enough to override 
domestic constraints. Rather than accepting their inability to par-
ticipate, as they might have done if a peaceful approach was their 
primary concern, the Syrian Brothers continued to pursue power 
through decidedly less-than-moderate means. On the other hand, 
it is remarkable that despite a history of repression and exclusion 
from politics, the Syrian chapter has returned to the moderate phi-
losophy with which it began its historical trajectory. 
 JORDAN 
 
 The Jordanian Brotherhood enjoys a long history of accom-
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modation with the regime—although this pattern has changed in 
recent years—and has consequently led a peaceful and moderate 
movement. Egyptian preachers founded the organization in the 
1940s and 1950s. Although Egyptian leadership initially controlled 
the movement, the Jordanian Brothers elected their own leaders 
following Nasser’s crackdown.73 The group dominated elections 
in 1989 and espoused many rights associated with democratic 
governance during the following session of parliament. In 1993, it 
formed the Islamic Action Front (IAF) to act as its political wing. 
 Like the Egyptian chapter, the Jordanian Brotherhood ar-
gues that democracy is inherently Islamic. It has highly demo-
cratic internal operations, perhaps more so than any other party 
in the Middle East; party leaders are elected by the membership 
and experience a high degree of turnover.74 “In earlier years, the 
Jordanian Islamist movement was something of a trendsetter for 
its Arab counterparts, since the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood ... 
always placed great stress on political freedoms.”75 It is conceivable 
that because Jordan offered greater freedom to participate in poli-
tics, the Jordanian Brotherhood’s articulation of political freedoms 
gave the other organizations a model to which to aspire. The IAF 
issued a document highlighting a new reform program in Octo-
ber 2005, “following the lead of their Egyptian and Syrian coun-
terparts”76 and capitalizing on a moment of political openness in 
the region.77 While opportunity structures clearly play a role, we 
cannot disregard the possibility of experience sharing among the 
national Brotherhoods. The document was “so full of liberal and 
democratic ideas and language that a leader of a secular opposition 
party was forced to confess that it differed little from the programs 
of other parties.”78 Nevertheless, the Jordanian Brotherhood has 
paid comparatively less attention to liberal reform issues in recent 
years, and instead has focused on international issues such as the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, due partly to its substantial Palestinian 
membership. Like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the move-
ment is internally divided over the question of whether it should 
opt for a cooperative relationship with the regime or adopt a more 
openly critical stance.79 If network norms played a larger role, we 
80 Mysliwiec   •  Brothers Without Borders? 
might expect to see more resounding support for liberal reform.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The preceding cases suggest that domestic opportunities, in-
ternal leadership shifts, and international pressures combine to mo-
tivate the Brotherhood to develop and publicize positions in favor 
of liberal reform at particular historical moments. Relative liberal-
ization of the political system allowed the Egyptian Brotherhood 
to compete, and public scrutiny of its positions encouraged the ar-
ticulation of liberal, democratic values. Its organizational resources 
served to sustain the Egyptian revolution, in which it cooperated 
with the secular opposition and put the goal of Egyptian democracy 
above its organizational interests. The succession of Bashar al-Asad 
provided new opportunities for the Syrian Brothers to participate 
in politics, encouraging the development of a policy of moderation 
toward the regime. Domestic opportunity structures are critical in 
influencing the Brotherhood’s commitments to democratic partici-
pation, but exclusion need not always preclude moderation. The 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood continued to articulate its faith in 
democracy despite hardship after 2005, while political exclusion 
induced the Syrian branch to decades of violence. This experi-
ence points to the “stickiness” of normative commitments: having 
published a reform platform in 2005, the Egyptian Brotherhood 
could hardly renege on its written belief in democracy. Conversely, 
the 1970s-era Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was not limited by any 
prior commitments to non-violence. Now that the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood has formally renounced violence, it seems likely that 
it will not defect. Organizational choices, even if adopted for in-
strumental reasons, may end up carrying normative weight. The 
ascendancy of reform-minded elements of an organization’s lead-
ership can dictate its priorities, as with the increasing influence of 
the new guard within the Egyptian Brotherhood and the election 
of al-Bayanouni in Syria. In Jordan, conversely, the Brotherhood’s 
growing constituency of young Palestinians is shifting its emphasis 
from domestic to international issues. 
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It also appears likely that connections among the Brother-
hood have helped create a trend toward moderation and liberal 
norms. International linkages are based largely on personal rela-
tionships, however, and it is therefore difficult to determine the role 
played by transnational communication among the Brothers. It also 
seems probable that the Egyptian and Syrian Brotherhood’s pub-
lication of reform platforms induced Jordan to do so as well, and 
that Brothers living in the West have further encouraged modera-
tion. But while the international Muslim Brotherhood may strive 
for an ideal of peaceful political participation, changes in domestic 
opportunities and constraints will influence how—and whether—
the national chapters enact that norm at a particular historical mo-
ment. The Brotherhood’s international organization cannot explain 
the branches’ changes in attitudes toward reform over time. 
Increasing support within the Brotherhood for liberal reform 
has come in part from external networks that support those val-
ues. The decision of the Egyptian Brotherhood to initiate a human 
rights discourse and form committees modeled on committees in 
secular civil society complicates Adamson’s portrayal of the two 
distinct, closed ideological systems of global liberalism and political 
Islam. While material and institutional bases support both political 
Islam and global liberalism, it is a reality of the international system 
that certain institutions are stronger than others, and that there-
fore one network may eventually obtain dominance. Ideologies may 
gravitate toward the stronger underlying material structure, articu-
lating the norms that are essential to gaining access to its resources. 
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has therefore emphasized hu-
man rights partly to convince the West of its good intentions and 
to take advantage of greater political openness which, not coinci-
dentally, was created through Western pressure. This analysis thus 
suggests an opportunity for further research into how competing 
ideological frameworks can serve to influence one another.
The domestic orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood has 
been critical to its success. Islam, unlike the Catholic Church, has 
always been decentralized: it has “adjusted to a territorially de-
marcated international system” within the broader Islamic com-
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munity.80 Higher organizational integration among the national 
chapters might have impeded their efforts to build a broad social 
base in each country. Thus, the most successful transnational Is-
lamist movements are those that subordinate their international 
orientation to local political concerns, gaining legitimacy among a 
country’s population. Contrary to Joscelyn’s belief, the claim that an 
organization has ties to the Brotherhood means little without an 
understanding of how it has developed in that particular context. 
The importance of attention to domestic context is not 
unique to the work of Islamist organizations; it is also critical for 
transnational advocacy networks whose campaigns may fail if they 
do not take local realities into account.82 The preeminence of do-
mestic politics is therefore not unique to transnational Islam. De-
spite globalization, Monshipouri argues, “human identity has re-
mained national.”83 Repression has further reinforced the primacy 
of domestic politics in the Middle East and North Africa, and the 
Brotherhood has been shaped by the adverse political context in 
which it operates, more so in Egypt and Syria than in the compara-
tively friendly Jordan. Egyptian Brothers have often been prevented 
from leaving the country, limiting their opportunities for transna-
tional work.84 Indeed, despite greater integration into the interna-
tional system from the ratification of human rights treaties, Middle 
Eastern and North African states have increasingly violated human 
rights and repressed the civil society actors that defend them, often 
in the process severing the ties of activists to the international com-
munity. As a result, national leaders seem to insist that “state power 
must remain central to our analyses of social movement transna-
tionalism.”85 The reality is that in Arab countries where the oldest 
and best-established Islamist groups operate, the regimes are not 
conducive to transnational civil society.
 
CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to contribute to an understanding of 
the Muslim Brotherhood as a global non-state actor. The Brother-
hood has shown significantly “more staying power and better or-
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ganizational skills” on the domestic level than other international 
Islamist movements.86 While there has been a movement within 
the network toward a greater acceptance of human rights and lib-
eral norms, these trends have not developed as a result of entre-
preneurship by one organization that has worked to “sell” the idea 
to its counterparts. Instead, political opportunities and leadership 
shifts have created conditions that allow the Muslim Brotherhood 
branches in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan to enact these moderate val-
ues, which in turn may become “sticky.” Nevertheless, the informal 
communication and idea sharing that occurs between Brothers 
likely plays a role as well. This recent convergence toward a rela-
tively liberal, democratic model is due both to communication and 
political learning among the Brotherhoods and to international 
pressure for liberalization throughout the region.
The experience of the Muslim Brotherhood suggests that in 
order to be successful in transforming the political order, Islamist 
organizations must adapt to domestic contexts at the expense of 
their transnational ties. Ironically, the most effective transnation-
al political Muslim organization is one that has entrenched itself 
in domestic matters. Ultimately, the Muslim Brotherhood—and 
the slew of moderate Islamist organizations that follow its model 
across the Arab and Muslim worlds—will have greater influence on 
international politics than smaller, more tightly-organized groups 
like al-Qaeda. While al-Qaeda may succeed in making states reor-
ganize their security strategies, it is unlikely to create meaningful 
political change without embedding itself in the domestic context. 
The Muslim Brotherhood may have great impact on individuals 
whose loyalties to their governments are already compromised due 
to repression, and on the future of state power in the Muslim world. 
In addition to exerting pressure for reform, the Muslim Brother-
hood has increasingly adopted the language of human rights. The 
Egyptian branch has recently demonstrated the vital—and peace-
ful—role the Brotherhood can play in democratization. Despite 
the staying power of Arab regimes, the opposition and growing 
normative commitments of the Brotherhood are indeed powerful 
forces for liberal change in the region. 
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